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Abstract 
This paper, we introduce mainly the concept of beta cryptosystem, whose security is based on 
generalized discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization problem in the multiplicative group of finite 
fields. We show that the proposed public key cryptosystem based on generalized discrete logarithm 
problem and integer factorization problem, provides more security because of double computation 
comparing with the generalized discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization problem. Hence the 
adversary has to solve distinct discrete logarithm problems and integer factorization problem 
simultaneously in the multiplicative group of finite fields in order to recover a corresponding plaintext from 
the received cipertext. Therefore, this scheme is expected to gain a higher level of security. We next show 
that, the newly developed scheme is efficient with respect to encryption and decryption and the validity of 
this algorithm is proven by applying to message that are text and returning the original message in 
numerical examples. 
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1. Introduction 
        Since the Diffie-Hellman [1] seminal paper New Directions in Cryptography which 
introduced the concept of public key cryptography, many asymmetric cryptosystems were 
proposed. The new technics are based on hard mathematical problems. Among these 
cryptosystems, we can cite the famous RSA [2] which security relies on the impossibility of 
factoring a large integer. By the same way, Rabin in [3] proposed an RSA look alike 
cryptosystem based on the difficulty of extracting the square root modulo a large composite 
integer. Taking square root modulo a composite prime is equivalent to the factorization of the 
modulo. In another context, ElGamal introduces an efficient and simple cryptosystem in [4]. The 
security of the new scheme is based on discrete logarithm problem. The DLP is computationally 
very hard to solve when considering a prime field or the group of rational points of an elliptic 
curve defined over a finite field. 
However, it is understood that one day in the future the IFP and DL problems could be 
solved and when it happens, all cryptosystem schemes that depend on one of these problems 
will no longer be secure. One of the strategies to surmount this situation is by designing a public 
key cryptosystem scheme based on multiple hard problems. Undoubtedly, the security of such 
schemes is longer than schemes based on a single problem. This is due to unlikely solving two 
hard problems simultaneously. Many public key cryptosystem have been designed based on 
both IFP and DLP [5-23] but to design such schemes is not an easy task since many of them 
have been shown insecure.  
As outlined in the above, unfortunately we found that the entire existing public key 
cryptosystem scheme based on discrete logarithm and integer factorization cannot be regarded 
as secure. Therefore, we designed a new cryptosystem based on two hard problems namely; 
factoring and generalized discrete logarithm problems. With its guaranteed security, we also 
showed that the performance of the scheme requires reasonable numbers of operations in both 
encrypting and decrypting processes, which makes it very efficient to be implemented in the real 
world applications. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2, presented proposed 
beta cryptosystem. Section 3 the example for validation of beta cryptosystem. Section 4 result 
and consistency of algorithm. Section 5 explin the security analysis and discussion. Section 6 
discussed Efficiency performance of the beta cryptosystem. Conclusion is given in the final 
section 7. 
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2. The Beta Cryptosystem 
The algorithm consists of three subalgorithms: Key generation, encryption and decryption 
- Key generation: The key generation algorithm runs as follows (user 1 should do the following) 
1. Generate two large random (distinct) primes ݌  and ݍ, each roughly of the same size 
2. Compute ܰ ൌ ݌ ∗ ݍ and compute the Euler-phi function  ߮ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ݌ െ 1ሻሺݍ െ 1ሻ. 
3. Select a random integer	݁,	1 ൑ ݁ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such that		݃ܿ݀	൫݁, ߮ሺܰሻ൯ ൌ 1. 
4. Select a random integer b such that 2 ൑ ܾ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ െ 1.  
5. Choose any random element ߚ		of the multiplicative group ܼே∗ 	and Compute ݕଵ ൌ ߚ௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ. 
6. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique integer	݀,	1 ൑ ݀ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such 
that	݁݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ. 
The public key is formed by ሺܰ, ݁, ߚ௕ሻ	and the corresponding private key is given by ሺ݀, ܾ, ߚሻ. 
- Encryption: An user 2 to encrypt a message ݄	ሺ݉ሻ to user 1 should do the following: 
1. Obtain public key ሺܰ, ݁, ߚ௕ሻ. 
2. Represent the message as  ݉ ∈ ሾ1,ܰ െ 1ሿ. 
3. Get the original message hashed and assume that the resultant becomes	݄ሺ݉ሻ. 
4. The cipher text is given by   
 
ܥ=ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻߚ௕ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ                                  (1) 
 
- Decryption: To recover the plaintext ݄	ሺ݉ሻ from the ciphertext	ܥ, user 1 does the following: 
1. Compute	ݕଶ ൌ ߚఝሺேሻି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ߚି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ.    
2. Then compute ݕଷ ൌ ሺݕଶሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
Recover the plaintext ݄	ሺ݉ሻ by computing ሺሺݕଶሻ௘ ∗ ܥሻௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ.                                  (2) 
 
 
3. Example  
To make our construction easy to comprehend, we illustrate an example to show the 
basic principle of our scheme. However, practitioners are not recommended to choose such 
keys or parameters in practice since inappropriate parameters will make this scheme vulnerable 
to attacks. Let the two primes be p = 29 and q = 43 and set N = 1247 and ߮ሺܰሻ= 1176. 
Key generation: The key generation algorithm runs as follows (user 1 should do the 
following) 
1. Select a random integer	݁ ൌ 11, such that		݃ܿ݀	ሺ11,1176ሻ ൌ 1. 
2. Select a random integer ܾ ൌ 19.  
3.  Choose any element ,ߚ ൌ 10of the multiplicative group ܼே∗ 	and Compute ݕଵ ൌ ߚ௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ10ଵଽሺ݉݋݀	1247ሻ. 
4. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique integer	݀ ൌ 107,	1 ൑ ݀ ൑
߮ሺܰሻ such that	11݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀	1247ሻ. 
The public key is formed by ሺܰ, ݁, ߚ௕ሻ	and the corresponding private key is given by ሺ݀, ܾ, ߚሻ. 
Encryption: An user 2 to encrypt a message ݄	ሺ݉ሻ to user 1 should do the following: 
1. Represent the message as  ݄	ሺ݉ሻ ൌ 1122 is represented as an integer in the interval 
ሾ1, ܰ െ 1ሿ 
2. The cipher text is given by   
ܥ ൌ ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻߚ௕ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ 791 
Decryption: To recover the plaintext ܯ from the ciphertext	ܥ, user 1 does the following: 
1. Compute	ݕଶ ൌ ߚఝሺேሻି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ߚି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ 917.    
2. Then compute ݕଷ ൌ ሺݕଶሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ 483. 
3. Recover the plaintext ݄	ሺ݉ሻ by computing ሺሺݕଶሻ௘ ∗ ܥሻௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ 1122   
 
 
4. Results  
We discuss our results according to the following criterion: 
- Consistency  of the beta cryptosystem 
- Security Analysis 
- Efficiency of beta cryptosystem 
To verify our scheme, we prove that the decrypting Eq. 2 is correct. For security 
consideration, we use a technique from heuristic security to show that the scheme is secure. 
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We do this by delivering the scheme to the literature for attacks. We consider three possible 
attacks by which an adversary (Adv) may try to take down the new cryptosystem. We define 
each attack and give the corresponding analysis of why this attack would fail. For efficiency 
performance, we evaluate the time complexity for both phases; encryption and decryption and 
also the communication cost for our scheme. 
 
Consistency: We validate our new scheme by proving the following theorem. 
Theorem1: If the algorithms of key generation and encryption run smoothly then the decryption 
of the encrypted message in decryption is correct. 
 
Prof. The Eq. 2 above is true for all encrypted message  
Then, in encryption algorithm, 
                   	ܥ ൌ ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻߚ௕ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 and decryption algorithm , 
              	ݕଶ ൌ ߚఝሺேሻି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ   ൌ ߚି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ  
 
And      ሺݕଶሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ሺߚି௕ሻ௘݉݋݀	ܰ, 
 
ሺሺݕଶሻ௘ ∗ ܥሻௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ሺߚି௕௘ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻሻ௘ߚ௕௘ሻௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻሻ௘ௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ݄ሺ݉ሻሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ. 
 
 
5. Security Analysis 
We show that our scheme is heuristically secure by considering the following three most 
common attacks. 
- Direct attack: Adv wishes to obtain all secret keys using all information available from the 
system. In this case, Adv needs to solve IFP and GDLP. The best way to factorize the 
modulus	ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ, is by using the number field sieve method (Lenstra et al., 1990). However, this 
method is just dependent on the size of modulus n and it is computationally infeasible to factor 
an integer of size 1024-bit and above. Next, to increase the security of our scheme, we must 
select strong primes (Gordon, 1984) to avoid attacks using special-purpose factorization 
algorithms. We can achieve and maintain the same security level for GDLP by selecting the 
modulus ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ	with ௣ିଵଶ  and  
௤ିଵ
ଶ  respectively are product of two 512-bit strong primes. 
- Factoring attack: Assume that the Adv successfully solves the factoring problem so that he 
knows the secret keys	ሺߚ, ܾሻ. With this information in hand, he learns that 
 
ܥ ൌ ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻߚ௕ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
                     
From the above equation, to recover the original message M, one has to remove the term ߚ௕ 
from C and this only can be done if one knows the secret numbers	ሺߚ, ܾሻ. Since at this stage the 
GDL problem remains hard to solve then the Adv would fail. - Discrete logarithm attack: Assume that the Adv is able to solve the GDL problem and thus 
obtain the secret integer b. He then knows that 
 
             ݕଶ ൌ ߚఝሺேሻି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ߚି௕ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
and 
ሺݕଶሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ൌ ሺߚି௕ሻ௘݉݋݀	ܰ 
By knowing this number the Adv tries to recover the original message M from the equation 
 
ܥ ൌ ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻߚ௕ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
ൌ ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻሻ௘ߚ௕௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 
Since the exponent e is public, he manages to remove the term ߚ௕௘ from C and 
obtains	ሺ݄	ሺ݉ሻሻ௘. Unfortunately, to read the original message he must has the secret d in hand 
but this is impossible since the IFP is hard to solve. 
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6. Efficiency Performance 
Next, we investigate the performance of our scheme in terms of number of keys, 
computational complexity and communication costs. 
The following notations are used to analyses the performance of the scheme. 
 
 SK and PK denote the number of secret and public keys respectively 
 ௘ܶ௫௣ is the time taken for a modular exponentiation and ௠ܶ௨௟ is the time taken for a modular 
multiplication 
 ௦ܶ௤௨ is the time taken for a modular square computation and ௦ܶ௥௧ is the time taken for a 
modular square-root computation 
 ௜ܶ௡௩ is the time taken for a modular inverse computation and ௛ܶ௔௦௛ is the time taken for 
performing a hash function, 
  |x| denotes the bit length of x 
Here we ignore the time performing modular addition or subtraction computation and we 
assume that the probability of the bit being selected as 0 or 1 is	ଵଶ. 
The performance of our beta cryptosystem is summarized as in Table 1. From Table 1, 
the sender performs 721 ௠ܶ௨௟ + ௛ܶ௔௦௛ time complexity for encryption and the receiver performs 
481 ௠ܶ௨௟ time complexity for decryption using the conversion ௘ܶ௫௣ = 240 ௠ܶ௨௟ [10]. Finally the 
communication costs or size of parameters of the scheme is 3|n|. 
 
 
Table 1: The performance of our new cryptosystem 
 
                                                                      Our beta cryptosystem 
 
                The number of keys                               SK                                                   3 
                                                                               PK                                                   3 
 
               Computational complexity               Encryption                             2 ௘ܶ௫௣ + ௠ܶ௨௟ + ௛ܶ௔௦௛ 
                                                                       Decryption                             3 ௘ܶ௫௣ + ௠ܶ௨௟ 
               Communication cost                        Encryption                             2n 
                                                                  Decryption                           n 
 
 
6.1 Discussion 
Most of the designated cryptosystems are based on a single hard problem like factoring, 
discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems. If one day an enemy could find 
a polynomial algorithm solving this problem, he then can read the original message from any 
corresponding encrypted message. 
Our new developed cryptosystem is prevented from this type of problem. This is 
because our scheme is designed based on two hard problems namely factoring and discrete 
logarithm. The enemy only can break this scheme if he can solve the two problems 
simultaneously and this is very unlikely to happen. If he manages to find a solution to one of the 
underlying hard problem, our scheme remains secure as the other problem remains hard to 
solve for at least another period of time. 
Our scheme next is protected from the most common considering attacks for scheme 
based on two hard problems. The performance analysis reveals that the developed scheme 
requires only minimal operations in encryption and decryption phases and thus makes it very 
efficient. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this present paper, we present public key encryption scheme based on integer 
factorization problem and generalized discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of 
finite fields. This kind of scheme definitely provides a new scheme with a longer and higher level 
of security than that based integer factorization problem and generalized discrete logarithm 
problem and also requires minimal operations in encryption and decryption algorithms and thus 
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makes it is very efficient. The present paper provides the special result from the security point of 
view, because we face the problem of solving on integer factorization problem and generalized 
discrete logarithm problem at the same time in the multiplicative group of finite fields as 
compared to the other public key cryptosystem, where we face the difficulty of solving the 
traditional on integer factorization problem and generalized discrete logarithm problem in the 
common groups. 
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